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The Preservation of Life
Richard A. McCormick, S.J.
Father McCormick is on the
staff of the Center for Bioethics
at the Kennedy I nstitute and a
widely known author in the field
of m edical- moral problems. H e is
a 0 a mem ber of the Editorial
Advisory Board of the Linacre
Quarterly.
Edward G. Ki roy , M.D., has
devoted his lead editoriaJ! to a
consideration of the basis on
which decisions to treat or not to
treat should be made. M y concern here is the conceptual clarity
concernin g wha t D r. Kilroy calls
" three methods of ethical analy sis available." It seems to me that
Dr. Kilroy has only confused the
matter.
For purposes of clarity I should
like to rehearse briefly what h e
regards as the available options.
First, there is the use of the
terminology " ordinary" and " extraordinary" means. This approach, he says, has lost much of
its usefulness "because of the
necessity of their application on a
situational basis." (This wording
is unfortunate. The application of
these terms has always been " situational," sc. relative to time,
place, availability of medicine,
care, patient's condition, etc.)
Secondly, there is a guideline centered on the potential for human
relationships. This Dr. Kilroy
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took from m y JAMA article. 2
He sees this as a criterion based
on the assessment of the individual's prospective quality of life.
Dr. Kilroy rejects this-though
the basis of his rejection is not
absolutely clear. At one point h e
says such considerations " expose
the individual and society to a
perilous path." At another he argues that the application of such
a criterion "would require a degree of omniscience quite beyon d
the limits of a ny known human
agency." Thirdly, Dr. Kilroy sees
the proper method as that " restricted to considerations of therapeutic benefit for the patient ."
More precisely , he words the mat ter as follows: "the decision for
therapy should be based solely on
whether this form of medical
therapy can be expected to restore the ill or defective child t o
that state of health for which the
therapy was planned."
I would agree with Dr. Kilroy
that the terms "ordinary" and
"extraordinary" are not too helpful. They are code terms for other
judgments. Paul Ramsey has recently pointed out that for all
practical purposes these terms
mean " imperative" and "morally
dispensable." He rightly insists
that they are, "as classifications,
incurably circular until filled with
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concrete or descriptive meaning."J
We have always k nown that, I
believe. But what has happened
in our time is t hat t he cruicial
underlying judgment (what Ramsey calls "concrete or descriptive
meaning" ) is increasingly focused
on a single element: benefit to the
patient.
D r. Kilroy has stumbled into
conceptual confusion precisely at
this point. He attempts to contrast " benefit t o the patient"
with a criterion anchored in the
potential for human relationships
or experience, as if the two were
different-the former being nonperilous, presumably because it
steers clear of quality-of-life considerations, whereas the latter,
involving such quality-of-life considerations, must be rejected. I
wish to show here that this distinction or contrast will not stand
up and that those who speak of
" benefit to the patient" are unavoidably involved in quality-oflife criteria, whether they use the
word or not. The term "quality of
life" scares people, largely I suppose because of its association
with a destructive history and its
possibly abusive interpretations.
P erhaps we can find a better
term. But to suggest that "benefit to the patient" is not only a
better t erm but a different concept because it avoids quality-oflife considerations is to play the
ostrich. This needs to be made
very clear here. And for this reason I shall try to word the matter
in a variety of ways.
First of all, let me point out
t hat increasingly both ethicists
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and others are speaking of " benefit t o t he patient" precisely in
t erms of qua ity-of-life considerations. I tern: moral theologian Sist er Margaret Farley, writing in
Yale University's occasional journal Reflection,4 notes that if it is
proper to consider means more or
less extraordinary in "relation t o
t he capacities for fullness of life
in an individual infant, then it is
t he case t hat we are basing
decisions for treatment or nontreatment on 'quality of life'
considerations." Farley regards
t his as inevitable "if one stands
within a t radition t hat values
every person and every human
life, but values physical life in relation to other human values." It
is obvious that Farley considers
t his-as do I-to be at the heart
of t he Catholic tradition on this
matter.
Item: the study of a multidisciplinary group published in Pediatrics.' In summarizing its reflect ions the group noted: " Neither
physicians nor parents are obliged
t o initiate or to continue actions
which do harm to t he well-being
of a newborn infant. That wellbeing consists generally in a life
prolonged beyond infancy, without excruciating pain and with
the potential of participating, in
at least a minimum degree, in human experience." The study continued: "Should it be necessary,
in t he case of disagreement between parents and physician, to
seek legal judgment, whether to
continue or to terminate care, the
court should weigh heavily t he
prognosis regarding quality o f life
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and the injunction 'do not
harm.''' (Emphasis added)
Item: a recent article by Norman L. Cantor, professor at Rutgers University Schaol of Law."
Professor Cantor points out that
in his decision Judge Muir
equates what is "in -the best interests" of Karen Ann Quinlan
with "remaining life," no matter
how dismal that might be. Cantor
could not accept that and wrote:
"I can perceive of no benefit to a
patient from being preserved in a
totally insensate state, with no
prospect of ever regaining consciousness. Moreover, the patient's expressions concerning criteria for a satisfactory or tolerable existence ought to be shown
great deference in determining
that patient's 'best interests.'''
Increasingly this is the way these
problems are being discussed.
Secondly, let me turn to a recept pastoral letter of the German
bishops to show that "benefit to
the patient" is a notion inextricably tied to quality-of-life considerations. On June 15, 1975, a
pastoral letter of the bishops of
the Federal Republic of Germany
was read in all the churches. It
was concerned with euthanasia
and care for the dying. At one
point the bishops noted that a
death worthy of man means that
"not all medical means are used
if death is artificially postponed
by doing so. This is the case, for
example, when life can, in fact, be
lengthened by means of medical
measures, an operation perhaps,
but when, unfortunately, despite
the operation, or as a consequence
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of it, the sick person will suffer
from severe physical or mental
disturbances in the period thus
wrung from death. In this situation the decision of the sick person not to undergo another
operation is to be considered
morally justifiable."i
The bishops then pose the
question about the moral duty to
use indefinitely artificial supports
such as the respirator. Their answer is extremely interesting and
will unpack the point I am making. They state: "As long as there
is any possibility of the sick man
recovering in this way, we will
have to use all such means. Also,
it is the duty of the state to ensure that even costly apparatus
and expensive medicines are
available for those who need
them. It is quite another matter
when all hope of recovery is excluded and the use of particular
medical techniques would only
lengthen artificially a perhaps
painful death."
"Recovery" - A Complex Term
Now what is to be noted here
is the term "recovery." The possibility of recovery determines, in
the bishops' statement and, I believe, in Dr. Kilroy's formulation,
whether certain life-supports and
interventions need be used or not.
If recovery is possible, they
should be used. However-and
this is crucial to the point I am
making-the term "recovery" is
not quite as simple as it might at
first seem. "Recovery" can mean
at least three things: 1) return
to the state of health enjoyed
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prior to illness, a full state of
health; 2) return to a lesser state,
perhaps one characterized by "severe physical or mental disturbance"; 3) return to spontaneous
vital functions without consciousness. All of these represent forms
of recovery in the sense that
death has been stayed. Now it
seems clear that if the bishops
would not deem obligatory (for
the patient) the medical interventions that produce the latter
two categories-a point they explicity make-then they would
not include them under the term
"recovery." This means that "recovery" necessarily implies a certain level of recovery or quality
of life. For if the means need not
be used by the patient and the
reason is that they do not produce "recovery," then the term
clearly means not just staving off
death, but also a certain quality
of life. What the term "recovery"
really means, then, in the bishops'
statement, is sufficient recovery.
Now that is, I submit, a straightforward quality-of-life judgment.
Our concern, then, should not be
precisely to avoid quality-of-life
considerations in decision-making
-a thing we simply cannot do in
our times, and never really could
-but to place such considerations within the value perspectives of the Christian tradition.
My third and final reflection
touches on Dr. Kilroy's own suggested criterion, and the language
he uses to describe it. He argues
that the decision for therapy
"should be based solely on whether this form of medical therapy
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can be expected to restore the ill
or defective child to that state of
health for which the therapy was
planned." He then applies this
also to cardiac and neuro-surgical
patients as follows: "The same
principle of instituting or discontinuing therapy on the basis of its
efficacy in achieving the goals for
which it is planned is applicable
to decisions regarding therapy for
severely demaged cardiac or
neuro-surgical patients when we
discontinue respirators after it
has become evident that their
further use cannot possibly restore the patient to health even
though the patient may have
varying abilities to fulfill his potential for human relationships."
And all this is stated as being different from quality-of-life criteria.
But here Dr. Kilroy must be
confronted with some hard questions. There are two key notions
in his presentatiaon: 1) restoration to a state of health; 2) the
condition (state of health) or
goals for which therapy was
planned. Now what does it mean
to "restore the patient to health"
or to restore "to that state of
health for which the therapy was
planned"? Obviously, the respirator, for example, has no plans or
goals where a state of health is
concerned. It is devised to do a
certain thing regardless of what
state of health or ill health the
patient is in. It is the physician
who has plans and goals. Therefore, "that state of health for
which the therapy was planned"
is a state of health aimed at or
planned by the physician using
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t he therapy. Now clearly such a
"state of health" or the "goals for
which it is planned" is capable of
degree-greater or lesser health ,
lesser or more profound ill health.
Some states of health, I take it,
would be states so dismal or intolerable that, although therapy
could be planned to achieve them,
it need not be used-and precisely because such a state of
" health" is unacceptable. And the
reason it need not be used is precisely that return to that state of
health or level of survival is considered unacceptable. That is exactly what the German bshops
had to imply when they used the
t erm "recovery" as the controller
of these decisions. And it is precisely what Dr. Kilroy must
wrestle with when he talks about
" restoration to health" and "goals
for which the therapy was
planned." If he does not get involved in such specification, if he
does not distinguish between
" restoration to health" and "restoration to sufficient health," he
commits the physician to a form
of vitalism (keeping life going independently of its condition or
potential), that is profoundly at
odds with Christian perspectives
on the meaning of life. For any
condition that staves off death
will be "health" or "recovery."
But if he does get involved in
such specification, he is involved
with quality-of-life considerat ions.
For instance, let us take a
child, or an adult for that matter,
whose life can be saved by surgi98

cal intervent ion. Let us further
suppose t hat that life will continue for many years after t he
surgery-but it will be a life lived
in total unconsciousness or in a
semi-comatose and totally dependent state. It would be agreed
by everyone, I would hope, t hat
no one need undergo such surgery
if that is t he kind of life it will
save, if that is the kind of health
it will "restore." The surgery
could be "planned" for that state
of health ; but no one need submit
t o such planning, though a person
is free to do so. Certainly this is
t he Catholic tradition on t his
matter.
In summary, t hen, when Dr.
Kilroy proposes as his decisional
method "therapeutic benefit for
the patient," he is not proposing
something different from quality
of life considerations. For there is
always the question of what level
of benefit to the patient is sufficient to deserve to be called a
"benefit." "Benefit" like "health"
is capable of definition along a
very broad scale. Some "planned
t herapies" would produce the
"benefit" of sheer survival; others
would restore to full or reasonably full good health. So when
Dr. Kilroy uses " benefit to the
patient" as a decisional criterion
and then contrasts this with quality of life criteria, he is using not
a different criterion, but only different words. Furthermore, just
as we can hide behind the circular
phrases " ordinary" and "extraordinary," so we can hide behind
"benefit to the patient." But the
notable thing about such lanLinacre Quarterly

guage is that we are hiading, that
is, failing to come to grips with
the very difficult and delicate reflections that alone can flesh out
the term "benefit" to the point
where it is more than an empty
con tainer. If we fail to recognize
this task and fail to undertake it ,
the no tion of "benefit to the patient" will be left an empty container, waiting to be fill ed by the
perspectives and outlooks of the
individual physician. Such perspectives can be qui te different
from those of the patient, and can
at times be highly questionable.
Therein lies the real danger.
That brings me to another aspect of Dr. Kilroy's formulation
that is deeply troubling. He says
that the decision for therapy
"should be based solely on whether this form of medical therapy
can be expected to restore the ill
or defective child to that state of
health for which the therapy was
planned." He applies the same
criterion to adult patients. Now,
as noted, it is the physician who
does the planning of therapy. If
the sole criterion of whether
treatment is to be used or not is
its effectiveness in reaching "the
state of health for which the therapy was planned," then the decision to use certain life supports is
controlled exclusively by the physician.
A Reversal of
Traditional Procedures
This was the tragic error in
Judge Robert Muir's decision in
the Quinlan case. When Judge
Muir stated that "it is a medical
decision not a judicial one" and
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then added that "I am satisfied
tha t it may be concurred in by
the parents but not governed by
them," he completely reversed
(probably unin ten tionally) traditional procedures. As Professor
Norman Cantor poin ts out: "This
b 1u e p l' i n t for decision-making
completely reverses normal procedures. Ordinarily, treatmen t decisions are made by the patient,
or by the patient's guardia
where the patient is incompetent
. .. This process accords with the
venerable legal doctrine known as
informed consen t . Under this
doctrine, a physician does not
make treatment decisions and
then seek the concurrence of a
patient or guardian."8 It ought to
be noted that this understanding
of things is also the official polic
of the American Medical Association.
I do no t believe that Dr. Kilroy
intended this result of his formu lation. But if treatment decisions
are made solely (as he insists) on
the " efficacy in achieving the
goals for which it is planned," I
do not see how he can avoid a position identical to that of Judge
Muir. Not only is that a reversal
of time-honored procedures ultimately destructive of the notion
of informed consent, but it puts a
burden on the physician h e should
be most eager to avoid-the burden of being solely responsible fo .
therapeutic decisions. His malpractice vulnerabilit is already
brutall y burdensome. In short,
then, the decisions for therapy
should not be based solely on "its
efficacy in achieving the goals for
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which it is planned," as Dr. Kilroy says, but it must also take
account of whether these goals
are acceptable to the patient, or
to those charged with his/ her
care.
Actually, what I believe Dr.
Kilroy ought to have pointed out
to us is the difference between
decision-making where adults and
infants are involved. Where
adults are involved, therapeutic
and life-sustaining decisions can
be individualized to the person.
That is, the notion of "benefit to
the patient" can be individualized. The adult has a past, perspectives on life and its meaning,
aspirations and achievements. All
these can be weighed by the patient in making life-sustaining decisions or by those who know the
patient best and presumably have
his best interests at heart. The
infant is different. The infant has
no past on which to build; he has
no known perspectives, value
judgments, aspirations. He has
had no life. Thus, the decision
cannot be individualized to such
considerations as it can in the
case of adults. This means two
things. First, the criteria used in
determining to save or let die
where an infant is concerned are
generalizable to all infants. Secondly, and as a consequence, the
criteria used must be the strictest
possible. That is, the very minimum potential for human experiencing or relationships must be
seen as sufficient warrant for attempting to save. Any other view
would be a racism of the adult
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world, and would unjustly deprive not simply one but (by logical generalizability) many infants
of their chance at life.
It is our task, and a terribly
anguishing one, to discover what
that minimum is. It is in such attempts that we may draw close to
understanding what "benefit to
the patient" means. In understanding this we shall surely be
dealing with quality of life considerations-even if we call them
by a different name. To fudge
that matter and to continue to
hide behind the unspecified term
"benefit to the patient" can be as
perilous to both patients and doctors as to apply unavoidable quality-of-life considerations in an
abusive and wrongful manner.
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